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SURVEY SECTION
Criminal Law. State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762 (R.I. 1999). The
Rhode Island Supreme Court interpreted section 12-1.3-2 of the
Rhode Island General Laws,' the criminal records expungement
statute, and held that persons who receive a suspended sentence
are treated the same as those who serve a term of imprisonment.
In addition, the court implicitly held that a plea of nolo con-
tendere2 is a conviction for purposes of the statute.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The appeal before the supreme court in this case arose from
three separate matters. On August 26, 1997, a superior court
judge heard three motions to expunge criminal records brought
pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws section 12-1.3-2, the ex-
pungement statute.3 The first case involved defendant Alejo, who
was charged with possession of a firearm by an alien.4 She pled
nolo contendere to the felony charge, and was given a five-year sus-
pended sentence.5 The second case involved defendant Berry. 6 He
pled nolo contendere to two amended and reduced charges of sim-
ple assault, a misdemeanor.7 He received two concurrent one-year
suspended sentences.8 The last case involved defendant Mc-
Creadie. 9 He was charged with conspiracy to commit larceny over
$500.10 He also pled nolo contendere to the felony charge and re-
ceived a term of one-year probation."
The superior court granted all three motions. 12 The State ob-
jected, arguing that under the expungement statute, none of the
defendants had waited the statutorily proscribed period before ap-
1. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
2. See Black's Law Dictionary 1048 (6th ed. 1990). Black's Law Dictionary
defines nolo contendere as "phrase meaning 'I will not contest it'; a plea in a crimi-
nal case which has similar legal effect as pleading guilty. . . ." Id.
3. See State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 763 (R.I. 1999).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. (The original charges against Berry were for second-degree sexual
assaults.).
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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plying for expungement. 13 The State appealed the decision of the
superior court on those same grounds.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Section 12-1.3-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws reads:
(a) Any person who is a first offender may file a motion for
the expungement of all records and records of conviction for a
felony or misdemeanor by filing a motion in the court in
which the conviction took place, provided that no person who
has been convicted of a crime of violence shall have his or her
records and records of conviction expunged.
(b) Subject to subsection (a), a person may file a motion for
the expungement of records relating to a misdemeanor con-
viction after five (5) years from the date of the completion of
his or her sentence.
(c) Subject to subsection (a), a person may file a motion for
the expungement of records relating to a felony conviction af-
ter ten (10) years from the date of the completion of his or her
sentence. 14
The State argued that the trial justice improperly granted the
defendants' motions because none of the defendants had standing
to file the motions for expungement of their criminal records. 15
The language of the statute permits a first offender to request ex-
pungement of his record after a certain period of time has passed
since the completion of his sentence. 16 Therefore, the defendants
must wait the proscribed statutory period, five years in the case of
a misdemeanor conviction, or ten years in the case of a felony con-
viction, from the date of the completion of the sentence, before they
have standing to request expungement. The court did not illumi-
nate the defendants' arguments. Presumably, it opposed the
State's interpretation of the statute, arguing that the language of
the statute is ambiguous and within the province of the superior
court judge's discretion.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court agreed with the State. 17 It
first laid out the oft stated principle that when a statute is clear
13. See id.
14. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
15. See Alejo, 723 A.2d at 763.
16. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-1.3-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
17. See Alejo, 723 A.2d at 764.
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and unambiguous, the court will apply the statute literally.' 8 The
court then held that in order to seek expungement, one must first
wait until the length of their sentence has passed, "regardless of
whether the sentence was for imprisonment, suspension of impris-
onment or probation, or any combination thereof."19
The court implicitly held that a plea of nolo contendere is a
conviction for purposes of the expungement statute. Therefore,
before a superior court judge can consider expunging a criminal
record, he or she must first find that the original sentence received
has expired, regardless of whether it included jail time.20
In this case, the supreme court addressed three instances of
expungement. Defendant Alejo was sentenced to a five-year sus-
pended sentence for a felony conviction in 1992.21 Her sentence
expired in 1997.22 Under section 12-1.3-2(c), she must wait ten
years, until the year 2007, to request expungement. 23 Defendant
Berry was sentenced to two concurrent one-year suspended
sentences for misdemeanor convictions in 1993.24 His sentence ex-
pired in 1994.25 He is eligible to request expungement in 1999
under section 12-1.3-2(b). 26 Lastly, defendant McCreadie was sen-
tenced in 1996 to a one-year term of probation for a felony convic-
tion.27 His term of probation expired in 1997. Under section 12-
1.3-2(c), he may request expungement in 2007.28 According to the
court's calculations, all three defendants lacked standing to re-
quest expungement at the time their motions were filed.29
CONCLUSION
Before requesting expungment of his criminal record, a person
convicted of a felony offense must wait ten years, and a person con-
victed of a misdemeanor offense must wait five years, from the date
18. See id. (citing Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Pastore, 519 A.2d 592, 593 (R.I.
1987)).
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 765.
28. See id.
29. See id.
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of completion of his sentence. Furthermore, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court found that the Rhode Island General Assembly in-
tended to treat all sentences alike for purposes of the expungement
of criminal records. A first offender sentenced to a lengthy term of
incarceration will carry the mark on their record for the same
length of time as a first offender who receives a slap on the wrist
and is sent home. The person who receives a suspended sentence
has a false sense of relief, since they may have a criminal record for
as long as fifteen years after their offense.
Carly E. Beauvais
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Criminal Law. State v. Mullen, 740 A.2d. 783 (R.I. 1999). When
the General Assembly modifies a portion of a criminal statute, the
effect of the modification upon pending prosecutions should: (1) be
considered on a case-by-case basis; (2) while taking into account
the provisions of section 43-3-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws;
and, (3) while taking into account the intent of the legislature in
enacting the modification.
In State v. Mullen,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court deter-
mined whether a defendant, charged with sodomy, should be pros-
ecuted after the legislature decriminalized sodomy between
persons who had attained the age of consent (sixteen years), by
repealing the sodomy provisions from that portion of the statute
prohibiting "abominable and detestable crimes against nature."2
The supreme court upheld dismissal of the charges pending
against the defendant, concluding that it would interfere with the
intent of the legislature to apply the general savings statute and
prosecute defendant for alleged violations of section 11-10-1 of the
Rhode Island General Laws.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The defendant, Timothy Mullen (Mullen), was charged with
nine counts of abominable and detestable crimes against nature
(sodomy) under section 11-10-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws.4
The indictment alleged that Mullen committed sexual acts upon
the victim when the victim was between the ages of fourteen and
seventeen.5 However, the State's bill of particulars stated that the
alleged acts took place when the victim was over sixteen years of
age.6
During the pendency of this indictment, the General Assembly
repealed certain provisions of section 11-10-1. 7 The trial justice
1. 740 A.2d 783 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 785.
3. See id. at 786.
4. See id. at 784; R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-10-1 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
5. See Mullen, 740 A.2d at 786.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 785. Section 11-10-1 was amended to read as follows: "Every
person who shall be convicted of the abominable and detestable crime against na-
ture, with any beast, shall be imprisoned not exceeding twenty (20) years nor less
than seven (7) years. P.L. 1998, ch. 24, § 1." Id.
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dismissed the nine counts of sodomy because the legislature re-
pealed that portion of the statute prohibiting such conduct.8 The
justice reasoned that the intent of the legislature was to
"decriminalize sodomy between persons who had attained the age
of consent."9
BACKGROUND
The general rule at common law was that without a saving
clause, "the repeal of a penal statute operated to bar prosecution
for prior violations of the statute."' 0 The common law rule was
based on the theory that the legislature, by its repeal, determined
that the conduct in question should no longer be prosecuted as a
crime." Rhode Island's general savings statute, section 43-3-23 of
the Rhode Island General Laws, states:
no suit, prosecution, or indictment pending at the time of the
repeal of any statute for any offense committed . . . shall in
any case be affected by the repeal, but the suit, prosecution,
or indictment may be proceeded with, and the act shall be
deemed to be in force for the purpose of prosecuting the act to
final judgment and execution or sentence, as the case may
be.12
Section 43-3-23 has the effect of saving criminal proceedings
pending at the time of the repeal of any penal statute. However,
the savings statute does not apply if such construction would be
clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the statute that has
been repealed. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Majority Opinion
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice
was correct in determining that it was the intention of the legisla-
ture to decriminalize the act of sodomy between adults of con-
8. See Mullen, 740 A.2d at 785.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 785 (quoting State v. Babbitt, 457 A.2d 1049, 1053-54 (R.I.
1983)).
11. See id.
12. See id. at 785 (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 43-3-23 (1956) (1999
Reenactment)).
13. See id. (quoting State v. Lewis, 161 A.2d 209, 212 (R.I. 1960)).
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senting age. 1 4 When the General Assembly repealed the portion of
section 11-10-1 making criminal the act of sodomy "with mankind,"
it intended that such activity be regulated solely by the sexual as-
sault criminal statute.15 Section 11-37-6 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws'16 designates the age of consent to be sixteen years of
age, and applies to sodomy as well as other forms of sexual behav-
ior.1 7 Thus, under section 11-37-6, a sixteen-year-old person may
be considered a consenting adult.' 8
The Rhode Island Supreme Court then looked to the savings
statute, and determined that the prosecution of the charges pend-
ing against Mullen would be inconsistent with the intention of the
legislature to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults. 19
The court reasoned that when the legislature, by virtue of modifi-
cation of a statute, decriminalizes certain conduct, the prosecution
of that conduct can have no deterrent effect. 20 Thus, the majority
held that the pending charges of sodomy against Mullen were in-
consistent with and repugnant to the express provisions of the re-
pealing statute, and the trial justice was correct in dismissing the
nine counts of sodomy.21
In addition, the majority stated the following analysis should
be applied in future cases where the defendant is charged with a
crime that has been repealed by the General Assembly. When the
legislature repeals or amends a portion of a criminal statute, the
effect of the modification upon pending prosecutions should: (1) be
considered on a case-by-case basis; (2) while taking into account
the provisions of section 43-3-2; and, (3) while taking into account
the intent of the legislature in enacting the modification. 22
The Dissenting Opinion
In their dissent, Justice Flanders and Justice Bourcier as-
serted that "[it was the legislative intent that [§ 43-3-231 was to
have the effect of saving criminal proceedings pending at the time
14. See id. at 786.
15. See id.
16. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
17. See Mullen, 740 A.2d at 786.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 786-87.
22. See id. at 786.
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of the repeal of any penal statute unless such construction would be
clearly repugnant to the express provisions of the repealing stat-
ute."23 The dissent reasoned that when the General Assembly en-
acts a repealing statute without including a specific saving clause,
the court will presume that the legislature enacted it with the in-
tention that the saving statute would have application, unless such
presumption is repugnant to the terms of the repealing statute.24
The dissent noted that the General Assembly's intent here was to
decriminalize sodomy as of the effective date of the repeal, how-
ever, the legislature said nothing about pending prosecutions for
acts of sodomy committed before the repeal. 25
The dissent disagreed with the majority's suggestion that
prosecution of a person for prior conduct that is no longer a viola-
tion of law is fundamentally unfair.26 Second, the dissent did not
believe that prosecution of a person for an offense that was unlaw-
ful at the time it was committed "can have no deterrent effect."27
Third, the effect of the general saving statute is that pending pros-
ecutions shall be unaffected by the later decriminalization of the
conduct absent an expressed and clear legislative intention to the
contrary. 28 Finally, the dissent expressed concern that the court's
ruling in this case will revive the common-law rule extinguishing
all pending prosecutions upon repeal of a criminal statute,
notwithstanding the absence of any indication in the repealing
statute that the legislature intended to do so. 29
CONCLUSION
In State v. Mullen, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
repeal of a statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting
adults operated to bar prosecution of an individual who committed
that crime before the provision was repealed by the General As-
sembly. In so holding, the court declined to apply the saving stat-
ute, which would enable the State to prosecute criminal charges
under the statute pending at the time the statute was repealed. As
23. Id. at 787 (Flanders, J., dissenting).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 787.
26. See id. at 789.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 790.
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the dissent noted, because this decision ran contrary to the savings
statute, this case will be cited for the proposition that whenever
the legislature decriminalizes conduct without indicating any ret-
roactive effect, it intended to override the saving statute and quash
all pending prosecutions for the repealed offense. 30
B. Jason Erb
30. See id.
20001 701
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Criminal Law. State v. Ratchford, 732 A.2d 120 (R.I. 1999). De-
fendants facing revocation of parole have no right of allocution
prior to reinstatement of a suspended sentence. However, defense
counsel may, in some circumstances, be afforded the opportunity to
address the court regarding factors that could mitigate punish-
ment or other issues which may affect the decision of the court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
One night in November of 1996, Warwick police began follow-
ing a car after determining that the occupants were possible sus-
pects of a robbery committed in the area.1 When police attempted
to pull the car over, the driver led police into a chase. 2 The police
pursued the car until it was driven up an embankment and
crashed into a tree. 3 When authorities reached the car, three men
were inside. 4 Eventually, two men died as a result of their inju-
ries.5 The driver, Anthony Ratchford (Ratchford), survived and
was charged with operating a vehicle in reckless disregard of the
safety of others, death resulting, and possession of a stolen
vehicle. 6
Because Ratchford was on probation at the time of the crash, a
probation revocation hearing was held.7 The court learned that in
1988 he was convicted of an offense and sentenced to ten years,
with seven and a half years of probation upon release.8 In 1993, he
was again charged with an offense. 9 He was sentenced to five
years with an additional four years suspended and four years pro-
bation. 10 Ratchford's 1993 sentence was to run consecutively after
the 1988 conviction."
At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing justice found that
Ratchford did indeed violate the conditions of his probation. 12 The
1. See State v. Ratchford, 732 A.2d 120, 121 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 122.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 121.
20001 SURVEY SECTION 703
hearing justice abruptly lifted the suspended sentences on the orig-
inal crimes.13 Ratchford was not given an opportunity to address
the court, commonly know as the right of allocution, prior to the
decision of the hearing justice. 14 In addition, his lawyer was not
able to address the issue of whether the suspended sentences
would be served concurrently or consecutively with the new sen-
tence.15 Ratchford appealed.16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
At the probation revocation hearing, the hearing justice did
not state on the record whether Ratchford's sentences should be
served consecutively or concurrently. 17 Consequently, Ratchford's
first argument to the Rhode Island Supreme Court was that the
hearing justice erred by imposing the sentences to be served con-
secutively, rather than concurrently.' 8 The supreme court noted
that the judgement of conviction form signed by the hearing justice
explicitly stated the sentences were to run consecutively. 19 Fur-
thermore, corroboration was provided by other documents in the
record relating to the 1993 conviction, which stated that the 1993
sentence should run consecutively to the 1988 sentence.20 There-
fore, the supreme court failed to find error with the decision of the
hearing justice.21
Ratchford also argued that the hearing justice admitted im-
proper hearsay testimony regarding identification of Ratchford as
the driver of the car.22 At the hearing, Officer Cardon testified
that Ratchford was the driver of the car, although he admitted that
his knowledge of Ratchford's name was not firsthand.23 Ratchford
argued that Cardon's testimony should not have been admitted
and without it there was not enough evidence to show that he was
the driver.24
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 122.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 124.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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The supreme court rejected this claim on three grounds. First,
the rules of evidence do not apply strictly in a probation revocation
hearing. 25 Therefore, Cardon's testimony may be admissible
although it is hearsay.26 Second, the State must prove the viola-
tion occurred only by reasonably satisfactory evidence. 27 Cardon's
testimony certainly was reasonable. Third, the findings of the
hearing justice will stand unless the hearing justice acted arbitrar-
ily or capriciously. 28
The significance of this case is rooted in Ratchford's third
claim. Rule 32(a)(1) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provides that:
[before imposing sentence the court shall afford counsel an
opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall ad-
dress the defendant personally and ask the defendant if he or
she wished to make a statement in his or her own behalf and
to present any information in mitigation of punishment. 29
The opportunity presented by Rule 32(a)(1) is the constitu-
tional right of allocution.30 Ratchford argued that this constitu-
tional right attaches prior to reinstatement of suspended sentences
in a probation revocation hearing.31 At Ratchford's hearing, the
hearing justice heard the witnesses' testimony and the parties' ar-
guments on the issue of whether Ratchford had violated his proba-
tion. 32 He then adjudged Ratchford on the violation and
terminated the proceedings. 33 The hearing justice failed to give
Ratchford or his counsel an opportunity to speak regarding factors
which may have mitigated punishment or affected the application
of the suspended sentences. 34 The State argued that this practice
is constitutionally firm, since a defendant enjoys the right of allo-
cution when the sentence is originally imposed and the reinstate-
ment at the probation revocation hearing is merely the
execution. 35
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(a)(1).
30. See R.I. Const. art. I, § 10.
31. See Ratchford, 732 A.2d at 122.
32. See id. at 123.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 122.
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The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion,
held that the right of allocution does not attach to probation revo-
cation hearings because Rule 32(a)(1) refers only to the original
imposition of sentencing. 36 Furthermore, Rule 32(f), which di-
rectly addresses the procedure at the revocation hearing, does not
provide the right of allocution.37 Instead, it provides that the "de-
fendant shall be afforded the opportunity to be present and ap-
prised of the grounds on which such action is proposed."38 The
legislature has also provided that during the revocation hearing
the "defendant shall have the opportunity to be present and to re-
spond."39 The court found neither the rule nor the statute could be
read to provide the right of allocution. 40
However, the court did find the hearing justice erred when he
failed to give defense counsel an opportunity to address the court
before execution of the sentence in this case.41 The statute from
which the superior court derives its authority to reinstate the sus-
pended sentence grants broad discretion as to what portion, if any,
of the suspended sentence shall be served.42 This discretion also
applies to the decision of whether the sentences should run consec-
utively or concurrently. 43 The court held that in order to make the
decision, the court must hear from defense counsel for two rea-
sons.44 First, there may be factors that mitigate punishment.45
Second, in the interests of economy, counsel may raise issues that
the justice has failed to address.46 For example, in this case the
justice did not discuss whether the sentence was to run consecu-
tively or concurrently. 47 This issue ended up being a subject of this
appeal, which could, and should have been, addressed below.4 Be-
cause of the error, the court remanded the case for resentencing.49
36. See id. at 123.
37. See R.I. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P. 32(f).
38. Id.
39. R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
40. See Ratchford, 732 A.2d at 123.
41. See id.
42. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-19-9 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
43. See Ratchford, 732 A.2d at 123.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 123-24.
2000]
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The Dissent
Justice Flanders, joined by Justice Bourcier, wrote separately
to dissent.50 Justice Flanders disagreed with the court's decision
to provide defense counsel a right to respond during the probation
revocation hearing in this case. 51 First, since Rule 32(f) and sec-
tion 12-19-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws are the sources for
probation revocation hearing procedure, the failure to mention the
right makes the opportunity unavailable.5 2 Justice Flanders also
stated that any issues counsel wishes to address regarding mitiga-
tion or other issue should be discussed during general argument.53
Second, Justice Flanders found that the issue should have been
considered waived on appeal, since the defendant did not raise it
with the trial justice below.54
CONCLUSION
In State v. Ratchford, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the basic criminal constitutional right of allocution is unavail-
able in the context of probation revocation hearings. At the same
time, the court also held that in certain circumstances, defense
counsel should be allowed to address the court. This opinion pro-
duces confusing results. First, the court found that defense coun-
sel deserved the right to address the court regarding factors to
mitigate punishment. It seems that the defendant's own testimony
would be essential on this point. Second, the court did not address
when "certain circumstances" will arise to trigger defense counsel's
right to address the court. Therefore, the applicability of the
court's rule is unclear.
Carly E. Beauvais
50. See id. at 124.
51. See id.
52. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-9-9 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
53. See Ratchford, 732 A.2d at 125.
54. See id.
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Criminal Law. State v. Shepard, 726 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1999). A
charge of attempted larceny from the person may be sustained
with evidence that the object of the attempted taking was within
the presence and immediate control of the victim. Evidence of at-
tempted physical trespass is not required.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In February of 1995, the defendant, Daniel S. Shepard (Shep-
ard), was involved in a traffic accident.' The other driver involved
in the accident, a woman driving a mini-van, determined that she
had enough time to proceed through the intersection before the de-
fendant's car would reach her.2 Unfortunately, she was wrong and
the defendant's car struck her car in the rear driver's quarter as
her car was about three-quarters of the way through the intersec-
tion.3 The driver's side of the victim's car was pushed up against a
building, trapping her inside.4
Shepard approached the victim's car, opened the passenger
door and demanded that the victim pay him for the damage sus-
tained to his car.5 He proceeded to grab the victim's wallet, which
was located on the passenger seat.6 He looked through it, but put
it down when he found that it was empty.7 The victim, in an at-
tempt to get away from Shepard, put the vehicle into reverse.,
However, Shepard again reached into the car, pulling the victim's
car phone from the plug.9 The victim grabbed the cord and strug-
gled with the defendant for possession of the phone. 10 Ultimately,
Shepard dropped the phone, jumped out of the victim's car and left
the scene."
Shepard was charged with assault with intent to commit rob-
bery.12 After the State presented its case, the defendant moved for
1. See State v. Shepard, 726 A.2d 1138 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 1139.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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a judgment of acquittal. 13 The trial justice granted the motion,
finding that there was no evidence to support the charge.14 He re-
duced the charge to the lesser included offense of attempted lar-
ceny from the person. 15 Shepard then moved to dismiss the
attempted larceny from the person charge. 16
The language of the larceny from the person statute reads,
"[elvery person who shall steal or attempt to steal from the person
of another, any money, goods, chattels, or other article.., shall be
imprisoned .... "1 7 The defendant interpreted "from the person" to
require that the attempt be made on the actual person of the vic-
tim, not merely something within her presence.' 8 Shepard then
requested that the jury be instructed on the lesser included offense
of attempted larceny under section 11-41-6, which has no "from the
person" language.' 9
The trial justice denied Shepard's motion to dismiss.20 In-
stead, he instructed the jury "that it was not a defense to the crime
to assert that the property in question was not literally in the
hands of the victim or directly on her person when the attempt to
take it from her occurred." 2 ' Thus, the court adopted a broader
view of the "from the person" language. 22 Shepard appealed. 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In deciding this appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court had
to determine whether the superior court's statutory interpretation
of "from the person" was correct. However, before doing so, it
noted that under either a strict or broad interpretation, Shepard's
conviction would still stand.24 This is because during the struggle
over the car phone, where the defendant was trying to take the
phone from the victim, the victim managed to grab hold of the
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
16. See id.
17. R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-7.
18. See Shepard, 726 A.2d at 1139.
19. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-6 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 1140.
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cord.25 Therefore, when Shepard was trying to wrestle the victim's
phone away from her, there was an attempted larceny.26
The court then proceeded to the substantive issue regarding
the proper construction of section 11-41-7 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws. 27 Shepard argued that at common law there were two
distinct crimes: the crime of larceny from the person and the crime
of simple larceny.28 The first crime, larceny from the person, was
codified in order to criminalize pickpocketing and required an ac-
tual taking from the person. 29 The less offensive conduct of taking
property from the immediate presence of the person would not be
enough to charge someone with larceny from the person. 30 The de-
fendant argued that the language contained in section 11-41-7 is
derived from the common law and therefore, it should be subject to
the same strict interpretation. 31
The State disagreed. 32 It argued that there is ample support
in the common law for the broad interpretation of "from the per-
son."33 For example, when North Carolina state courts faced a
similar question of statutory construction, they relied on common
law definitions to hold that "[p]roperty is stolen 'from the person,' if
it was under the protection of the person" at that time.34 Further,
the North Carolina court concluded that "[piroperty may be under
the protection of the person although not actually attached to
him."3 5 The State argued that Rhode Island should follow this
broader interpretation.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court recognized the argument
implicit in the defendant's advocacy for strict construction: if lar-
ceny from the person could be committed absent an actual taking,
then what difference from the crime of robbery?36 In Rhode Island,
the applicable definition of robbery is taken from the common law
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-41-7 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. State v. Buckom, 401 S.E.2d 362, 365 (N.C. 1991) (quoting R. Perkins & R.
Boyce, Criminal Law 342 (3d ed. 1982)).
35. Id.
36. See Shepard, 726 A.2d at 1140.
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and reads, "the felonious taking of money or goods of any value
from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by
violence, or putting him in fear."37 Shepard argued that the ab-
sence of the phrase "in his presence" from the larceny statute must
signify the intent of the legislature to require an actual taking.38
Shepard's view was adopted in a similar case by the Utah Supreme
Court in State v. Lucero.39 However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court disagreed on the exact same issue.40
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was faced with the bottom
line that jurisdictions were split over whether constructive taking
satisfied the larceny from the person statute.41 Making the deci-
sion for Rhode Island, the court chose to adopt the broader inter-
pretation advocated by the State.42 First, it noted that in answer
to the question regarding the distinction between robbery and lar-
ceny from the person, the element of violence makes the two crimes
different.43 Second, it reasoned that the policy behind allowing a
"constructive taking" to satisfy the larceny statute is the "potential
for violence that inheres in a theft of property taken when it is in
the immediate presence of the victim." 4 4
In this particular case, Shepard's conduct justified a charge of
attempted larceny from the person, even if there were no actual
trespass, because of the "assaultive nature" of his attempted tak-
ing.4 5 Not only did he grab the victim's wallet while she was
trapped in the car, he also attempted to wrestle her car phone
37. Id. (quoting State v. Domanski, 190 A. 854 (R.I. 1937)).
38. See id. at 1141.
39. 98 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1972).
If immediate presence means the same as from the person in the grand
larceny statute, then one would wonder why the same would not apply to
robbery. Why would the legislature have included the phrase 'or immedi-
ate presence' in the definition of robbery if the words 'from his person' also
meant 'immediate presence'?
Id. at 351.
40. See In re Welfare of D.D.S., 396 N.W.2d 831, 832 (Minn. 1986) (neglecting
to find that legislature's failure to use the phrase 'in his presence' in the larceny
statute meant that it intended to exclude constructive taking from the statute,
though it used the same phrase in the robbery statute).
41. See Shepard, 726 A.2d at 1141.
42. See id. at 1142.
43. See id. at 1141.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1142,
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away. 46 Both items were within the purview and presence of a
dazed and confused victim. 4 7 The court was satisfied that this con-
duct was within the contemplation of the aim of the larceny from
the person statute.
CONCLUSION
In State v. Shepard, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the crime of attempted larceny from the person does not re-
quire an actual trespass on the physical person of the victim. As a
result, a broader range of conduct is criminalized under section 11-
41-7 of the Rhode Island General Laws. Some of this conduct pre-
viously amounted only to the crime of attempted larceny, a less
serious charge. In addition, this holding makes larceny more like
robbery and puts the judiciary in the position of determining
whether the conduct was sufficiently assaultive or violent in na-
ture to justify a larceny from the person charge.
Carly E. Beauvais
46. See id.
47. See id.
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